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A Critical-Realist View of Housing Quality
within the Post-Communist EU States:
Progressing towards a Middle-Range
Explanation
ADRIANA MIHAELA SOAITA & CAROLINE DEWILDE
Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT Employing a long-term perspective, we explore whether ideologically rooted
quality outcomes of housing provision under communism have persisted during the post-com-
munist construction of housing markets. Drawing on theories of path-dependent change, we
hypothesize that patterns of housing quality still reflect past lines of division, namely the
Soviet housing model, and the classical and reformist models of the Eastern Bloc. Using a
critical-realist approach to housing quality, we relate households’ experiences to key underly-
ing structures; this ontological depth is then operationalized by means of micro- and macro-
indicators used as input for hierarchical cluster analyses. Findings support our main hypoth-
esis, yet there is more diversity in households’ experiences than initially assumed. Our study
advances a valuable middle-range epistemological frame for understanding the complex
social reality of housing and helps shatter the growing view that communist housing systems
were all too similar.
KEY WORDS: Housing quality, Path dependence, Cluster analysis, Post-communism,
Eastern Europe
1. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) exposed the vulnerable position of housing in the
political economy of financialized capitalism (Lapavitsas 2009). If financial innova-
tions expanded mortgaged homeownership to previously excluded groups, “created”
housing wealth during booms and made this wealth more liquid to draw upon (Smith
and Searle 2010), the subsequent events reminded us that no one can create some-
thing from nothing. Home values crashed, interest rates were cut to historic lows,
billions of newly printed money flooded the global economy and too-big-to-fail
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banks were bailed out, transforming a private into a public debt crisis. We now know
more about the causes and implications of these events (Jones, Cowe and Trevillion,
2017; Stiglitz 2013) yet one can still observe the ubiquitous Anglo-Saxon focus of
these narratives.
We bring a contra-point to this dominant story by focusing on the housing systems
of the post-communist states. The GFC did ripple out to these economies to various
degrees, but economic recessions were much smaller than those of the 1990s
(Table A1 in online annex). Although the housing booms in some of these countries
were amongst the highest and the busts amongst the deepest globally, housing
volatility had modest impacts on economies and households as most homes are
owned outright and residential mobility is low. Described as “property without mar-
kets” (Zavisca 2012) and “super-ownership societies” (Lowe and Tsenkova 2003),
the post-communist housing systems pose the main issue of housing quality rather
than housing volatility and debt (Norris and Shiels 2007). While the welfare role of
outright homeownership has been recognized (Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015;
Struyk 1996), the implications of housing quality to households’ well-being received
less attention (Mandič 2010; Mandic and Cirman 2011; Soaita 2014).
This paper aims to examine the extent to which patterns of housing quality across
the 11 post-communist EU countries1 share commonalities, and where differences
arise. We acknowledge that comparisons are not neutral epistemological devices: too
far a distance obscures dissimilarities, whereas too close-up a view enhances diver-
sity. Along this line, fresh debate is emerging amongst scholars drawing attention to
ideas of persistent similarity (Stephens 2010; Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015), and
those observing emerging divergence (Hegedüs, Lux, and Teller 2013; Miao and
Maclennan 2016). We contribute to this debate by employing a critical-realist
approach to the conceptualization of housing quality, in order to explore whether ide-
ologically rooted quality outcomes of housing provision during communism have
persisted during the post-communist construction of housing markets.
Critical-realism was developed as a philosophy of the social sciences by Bhaskar
(1989), further advanced by sociologists, most notably Archer (1995) and Sayer
(1992), having also inspired some noteworthy housing analyses (e.g. Fitzpatrick
2005; Lawson 2003). Rooted in the key critical-realist concept of “stratified ontol-
ogy”, we relate households’ experiences of housing quality (the top level of reality)
to key “underlying structures” (the deepest level of reality). This ontological depth is
then operationalized by means of micro- and macro-indicators, used as inputs for an
explorative hierarchical cluster analysis in order to discover patterns across countries
and to reflect on some of the causal mechanisms that have shaped them.
Our analysis rests on theories of path-dependent change (Archer 1995) in order to
understand the ways in which past legacies and novel (dis)continuities combine to
shape current housing quality outcomes. Building on Kornai’s (1992) distinction
between the political economies of reformist and classical communist states, and
Hegedus and Tosics’s (1992) differentiation between the housing models of the East-
ern Bloc and the USSR, we find that countries still cluster along historic differences,
yet there is more diversity in households’ experiences than initially assumed.
The importance of our analysis is twofold. First, discovering patterns of difference
and similarity across countries brings a valuable epistemological framework to
understanding the complex social reality of housing in order to inform policy ques-
tions, contextualize specific analyses or appreciate why expectations and aspirations
may differ. Second, we problematize the uncritical view that communist housing
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systems were all too similar and bring necessary nuances to the over-generalist label-
ling of “post-communism”. The paper advances as follows. Section 2 outlines our
conceptual and analytical approach to housing quality. Section 3 problematizes the
claim that communist housing systems were all too similar by distinguishing
between three different housing models; we hypothesize that ideologically rooted
quality outcomes of housing provision under communism are still relevant today.
Section 4 maps some important post-communist developments in the housing sys-
tems and allied socio-economic and demographic structures across countries, particu-
larly after 2000. We present the methodology in Section 5 and the results in
Section 6. Section 7 reflects on the broader implications of our analysis and raises
some questions for future research.
2. The Ontological Depth of Housing Quality: A Critical-Realist View
There is no shortage of approaches to conceptualize housing quality at the level of
households (for a review see Clapham, Clark, and Gibb 2012). Embedded in the the-
oretical perspectives of particular disciplines/analysts, housing quality has been seen,
sometimes un-problematically, as the realization of preferences (economics), well-
being (psychology) or normative standards (policy). Structurally inspired accounts
tended to see housing quality as an outcome of interacting structural socio-economic,
policy and institutional processes, being stratified along social class, space, ethnicity
or gender. Our theoretical position follows Kemeny’s (1988, 212) call for a critical
awareness regarding the social construction of “housing reality” as “the interaction
between structural factors and the actions and counteractions of individuals as they
struggle to make sense of their world, come to terms with it or attempt to change it”
as well as “by one definition of reality being imposed on other individuals through
the exercise of power in institution”. To this aim, we find the critical-realist concepts
of open system and ontological depth (Bhaskar 1989) particularly helpful for anchor-
ing our analytical framework.
Bhaskar’s (1989) critical-realist philosophy conceives social systems as being
inherently open; it follows that housing outcomes are shaped by forces both within
and beyond “housing systems”.2 This view permeates recent conceptualizations of
housing or residential “regimes”, which recognises housing’s wider societal implica-
tions and engages with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theory of welfare-state regimes,
and Hall and Soskice’s (2001) political economic thesis of varieties of capitalism
(e.g. Dewilde and De Decker 2016; Hoekstra 2010; Lapavitsas 2009; Schwartz and
Seabrooke 2009).
Not only are social systems inherently open, but they have “ontological depth”, as
Bhaskar (1989) argues. Accordingly, households’ experiences of housing quality can
be viewed as the upper layer of “the empirical” (what we can directly experience
and observe). The deepest stratum of “the real” (all that exists) consists of underly-
ing social structures that influence the empirical configurations, including potential,
yet not actualized powers of objects/structures. The middle echelon of “the actual”
contains generative mechanisms which activate (or inhibit) the power of structures,
causing the patterned occurrence of empirical events/facts. Such mechanisms could
be conceived of as ideologies, social norms, legal rules or processes. While identify-
ing causal mechanisms constitutes the core of critical-realist explanations, the
acknowledged difficulty of identifying them in substantive research has not escaped
criticism (Demetriou 2009; Reed 2008; Reiss 2007).
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Drawing on this critical-realist perspective, we relate households’ experiences of
housing quality (“the empirical”) to key underlying structures (“the real”). Based on
existing literature, the concluding section will flag some causal mechanisms as possi-
ble explanations of our results. Figure 1 presents this critical-realist view on housing
quality.
Building on previous scholarship (Mandič 2010; Mandic and Cirman 2011; Norris
and Shiels 2007; Soaita 2014), we consider three key dimensions of housing quality
at the level of households: housing conditions, by which we understand the material-
ity of the home and its location; households’ occupancy arrangements, which are
complex outcomes of affordability levels, cultural values, housing strategies and con-
sumer choices; and housing inequality through place and income. These dimensions
are important for the extent to which housing provides a space of shelter, a place of
home, a symbol of social status and a gate to citizenship rights.3 We show in
Sections 2 and 3 that most citizens were poorly housed by the end of communism
and housing quality has since remained problematic, more so in some countries than
others. To enable cross-country comparability, we opt for accepted normative/’
objective’ measures with no assumptions of these matching individual preferences or
policy aims (Mandic and Cirman 2011; Norris and Shiels 2007).
Drawing on scholarship relating housing to wider social structures, we consider
five key underlying structures that influence households’ housing quality (Figure 1).
It has been widely recognized that housing systems and/or outcomes are embedded
in the social structures of the political economy (e.g. Aalbers and Christophers 2014;
Bourdieu 2005) as much as they are shaped by housing policies (Kemeny 1981).
Analysing the relative weight of levels of economic development versus recognized
models of housing policy regimes in the EU, Mandic and Cirman (2011, 782) argue
that “differences in housing quality reflect differences in levels of wealth among
nations”, with economic development being “the single, most important determi-
nant”. The second though much weaker structural determinant was the past experi-
ence of communist housing provision, which was associated with somewhat better
housing conditions than those expected by a country’s wealth. Hence, our first and
second structural domains refer to economic structures and communist housing poli-
cies, respectively.
As housing policies since 1989 have concentrated on the construction of neoliberal
markets as devices for the provision and distribution of houses and finance (Clapham
et al. 1996; Struyk 1996), the housing market constitutes the third structural domain
in our analysis, although its more informal and less dynamic nature in the post-
communist space has been recognized (Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015; Struyk
1996; Zavisca 2012). Our fourth structural domain refers to changing demographics,
Households’ 
housing quality 
(the empirical) 
Housing
conditions
Households’
(affordability) arrangements
Housing
inequality
Causal 
mechanisms 
(the actual)
The social construction of demand and supply: 
Chains of housing production and financing;  Communist-built and allocation legacies; Property rights; 
Governance processes; Dominant ideologies; Social norms; State and households’ welfare strategies; etc.
Underlying 
structures 
(the real) 
Economic 
structures
Housing policy 
regimes
Housing 
markets
Demographic 
structures
Welfare
systems
Figure 1. A critical-realist approach to housing quality.
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which impact on dynamics between supply and demand. While the concepts of life-
cycle, life course, pathways and transitions aim at understanding individuals’ con-
sumption needs and practices (Clapham, Clark, and Gibb 2012), these are situated in
the possibilities resulting from population growth or decline; the latter has indeed
become a key political concern in many post-communist nations. Finally, our fifth
domain recognizes the welfare system’s power over the cost of housing (e.g. De
Decker and Dewilde 2010; Delfani, De Deken, and Dewilde 2014, 2015). While not
negligible, housing subsidies are notoriously difficult to measure, particularly in the
post-communist countries (e.g. untaxed grey-economy, planning breaches, discounts
in post-communist housing privatization and land restitutions, VAT reduction and
mortgage guarantees); conversely, direct governmental housing expenditure is close
to null (Eurostat 2016). Therefore, risks of poverty and social exclusion, related as
they are to both governments’ commitment to welfare provision and households’
ability to consume adequate housing, will guide our analysis.
Whilst we relate households’ housing quality to key underlying structures, we
should note that we make no assumption that certain structural arrangements should
necessarily produce certain outcomes, for causality is seen by critical realists as
probabilistic and contingent (Lawson 2003); for instance, structural powers may not
yet be activated or may be cancelled out by opposing tendencies (e.g. while mort-
gage markets exist, households’ income, cultural values or risk appetite may inhibit
mortgage demand).
Finally, we concisely reflect on the idea of path-dependent change in a stratified
ontology (Archer 1995). Change may occur at the obvious level of events (“the
empirical”); this was theorized under the frame of “critical juncture” by identifying
contingent choices that set a future trajectory, which is thereafter difficult though not
impossible to reverse. Critical juncture explanations became popular in housing stud-
ies (Housing, Theory and Society, volume 27, issue 3) although they were criticized
by a different branch of path dependency scholars. For instance, Malpass (2011)
argues that change occurs incrementally through intentional actions (always
restricted by essential preconditions), unintended consequences and non-decision-
making, encompassing both dynamism and continuity. This view seems more
attuned to the deep ontology of critical-realism. Rather than identifying events, iso-
lating the causal mechanisms that have induced path-dependent change avoids deter-
ministic explanations (Kemp 2015; Lawson 2003). Perceptions of policy failure,
struggle over resources, international pressures, power configurations, incremental
institutional change and geographical diffusion of knowledge may all act as causal
mechanisms of path dependence. For instance, Lux and Sunega (2014, 514) pro-
posed – in a quite critical-realist vein – an explanation of path dependence framed
under the “privatization trap” as “a trickle down mechanism” generating expectations
of continued privatization in the newly built social housing and reinforcing already
strong social norms of owner-occupation. Likewise, in-kind restitution of housing
and land, and housing privatization have resulted in fragmented property rights with
long-term consequences for how housing is developed and maintained (Górczyńska
2017; Lux, Cirman, and Sunega 2017; Soaita 2012; Soaita 2017; Vranic, Vasilevska,
and Haas 2015). We anchor the idea of path-dependent change in the communist
past by highlighting key differences across the political economies and forms of
housing provisions across the communist states in the following section.
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3. Theorizing Communist Housing Systems
We build on two major contributions, those of Kornai’s (1992) treatise on the politi-
cal economy of the socialist system and Hegedus and Tosics’s (1992) conceptualiza-
tion of the communist East European housing model (EEHM) as being essentially
distinct from its Soviet counterpart (Bessonova 1992). Their conceptual distinctions
overlap in meaningful ways (Figure 2).
Kornai (1992) differentiated between the political economy of classical versus
reformist socialist systems. The former “prevailed under Stalin, Mao Zedong, and
their disciples in other countries”; the latter “evolved (in chronological order) under
Tito in Yugoslavia, Kadar in Hungary, Deng Xiaoping in China, and Gorbachev in
the USSR; some further countries could be named as well” (Kornai 1990, 131/132).
While the reformist-socialist countries still maintained the “fundamental attributes of
a socialist system”, i.e. communist party’s undivided power, dominant role of state-
owned enterprises and centralized bureaucracy, steps were nonetheless taken towards
some political liberalization, some degree of decentralized control of the state-owned
sector, support/tolerance for a somewhat larger quasi-private sector and crucially
some easing of shortages for consumer goods, including housing. These typologies
should, however, be seen as abstract constructs for “at no time in the history of any
specific country has its system corresponded exactly to any of these models” (Kornai
1992, 20). Kornai also emphasized the matter of degree within both classical and
reformist forms of socialism as well as across different life domains.4 While market-
socialism was the most advanced tendency of reformist socialism, “a partial, moder-
ate change” (Kornai 1992, 386) may also qualify a country as reformist in relation to
particular investigations.
Reformist socialism was sustained in Yugoslavia and Hungary since the 1950s/
1960s; and was significant in Poland during the 1980s and in Czechoslovakia before
the 1968 Russian occupation.5 Overall, the communist housing systems of these
countries benefited from a quasi-market sector of self-building and/or cooperative
forms of provision which facilitated faster access to better housing; some more com-
plex forms of housing finance and/or decentralized control in state housing. Crucially,
the state supported alternative housing providers, i.e. households and cooperatives
(Clapham et al. 1996; Sillince 1990; Sykora 1996; Turner, Hegedus, and Tosics
1992). This broad picture could be qualified by housing policy by periods and coun-
try, but this is beyond the remit of our paper. Suffice to say that among the reformist
states except Poland, crude housing shortages were (almost) addressed, Czechoslo-
vakia having had one of the most impressive performances (Michalovic 1992).
Forms of Socialist Systems (Kornai, 1992): 
Classical socialism Reformist socialism
SOVIET MODEL 
USSR 
GDR 
CLASSIC EEHM 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
REFORMIST EEHM 
Yugoslavia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Czechoslovakia 
The Soviet housing model 
(Bessenova, 1992)
The East European housing model (EEHR) 
(Hegedus and Tosics, 1992)
Figure 2. Theorizing communist housing systems.
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Drawing broadly on the features of reformist systems, Hegedus and Tosics (1992)
coined the concept of EEHM as characterizing all countries of the Eastern Bloc, and
being essentially different from the housing model of the USSR. Criticized on episte-
mological and policy grounds (Kemeny and Lowe 1998), we find the concept useful
if adapted to reflect the important distinctions between the reformist and classical
states of the Eastern Bloc: we will henceforth differentiate between a reformist and a
classic EEHM (Figure 2).
As opposed to the reformist-socialist states, their classic counterparts employed to
a much larger scale the Soviet housing model (Bessonova 1992) which was estab-
lished by Stalin and continued by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The Soviet model of
the USSR best incarnates the right to free housing via state provision. State housing
was centrally planned in large, urban estates, whether flats were allocated by
local/central governments, state/municipal enterprises or enterprise cooperatives –
commonly the only “alternative” for the urban population was family overcrowding.
Given Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s commitment to state provision, urbanization
rates increased substantially in the USSR as well as in the GDR, which was the East-
ern Bloc country that most closely followed the Soviet model (Sillince 1990).
The housing systems of the other classical states of the Eastern Bloc (Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania) were nonetheless different from both the Soviet model and
the reformist EEHM. They also showed high degrees of difference among them.
Romania and Albania had the lowest housing investment as a percentage of total
capital investment over the whole communist period, whether the bulk of housing
was produced by the state or households (Sillince 1990). Albania’s counter-urbaniza-
tion policy was unique in the Eastern Bloc, only matched by Asian forms of commu-
nism. Bulgaria was unusual in that the state overwhelmingly used policies of
“building for sale” and shortages appeared to have been almost addressed by 1989, a
unique achievement among classical-socialist states (Sillince 1990). Given states’
lack of commitment to housing (which differed by periods), households had to
engage in self-building. But unlike similarly widespread practices in Yugoslavia, Slo-
vakia and Hungary – which were supported by the state and a quasi-market private
sector – Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian households produced poorer quality
dwellings.
Table 1 indicates key differences in terms of the relative share of new housing pro-
vision by different institutional organizations. For the last two decades of commu-
nism, it clearly indicates the split between classical and reformist states, with state-
provision ranging from 76 to 93% in the former (except Albania) and accounting for
only about a third in the latter. However, if we look at the first two decades, we
observe that households used to be active self-builders in both the classic and refor-
mist EEHMs – but never in the USSR and GDR. Since self-building was a predomi-
nantly rural phenomenon and state provision had a strong urban focus, a rural–urban
divide in housing quality was created, particularly acute in the classical states. Not
only are rural houses in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania currently older than those in
ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and ex-Yugoslavia, they are also of poorer
quality as classical states refrained from subsidizing alternative forms of provision.
State support was crucial not only for the quality but also for the quantity of hous-
ing. It could be argued that classical states accepted higher shortages than the refor-
mist ones. Exceptions were reformist Poland which registered high shortages; and
classical Bulgaria and the GDR which achieved remarkable output. Consequently,
50 A. M. Soaita and C. Dewilde
T
ab
le
1.
N
ew
ho
us
in
g
pr
ov
is
io
n
du
ri
ng
co
m
m
un
is
t
pe
ri
od
in
se
le
ct
ed
co
un
tr
ie
s
(r
ou
nd
ed
%
).
F
or
m
of
pr
ov
is
io
n
19
51
–1
96
0
19
61
–1
97
0
19
71
–1
98
0
19
81
–1
98
9
U
rb
an
po
pu
la
tio
n
19
50
19
90
C
la
ss
ic
al
st
at
e-
so
ci
al
is
m
S
ov
ie
t
m
od
el
E
st
on
ia
n
S
S
R
S
ta
te
&
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
82
87
93
95
47
71
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
18
13
7
5
L
at
vi
an
S
S
R
S
ta
te
&
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
–
86
90
87
45
70
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
–
14
10
13
L
ith
ua
ni
an
S
S
R
S
ta
te
&
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
–
81
77
78
28
69
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
–
19
23
22
G
D
R
S
ta
te
&
co
op
er
at
iv
es
b
83
94
89
85
55
77
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
17
6
11
15
C
la
ss
ic
E
E
H
M
A
lb
an
ia
S
ta
te
a
26
50
49
54
20
35
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
74
50
51
46
B
ul
ga
ri
a
S
ta
te
–
53
76
76
20
67
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
–
47
24
24
R
om
an
ia
S
ta
te
12
36
80
93
23
54
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
88
64
20
7
R
ef
or
m
is
t
st
at
e-
so
ci
al
is
m
R
ef
or
m
is
t
E
E
H
M
C
ze
ch
re
gi
on
S
ta
te
&
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
80
40
42
29
45
76
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
es
2
45
32
40
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
18
15
26
30
H
un
ga
ry
S
ta
te
&
h.
as
so
ci
at
io
ns
–
33
38
24
40
59
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
–
63
48
51
N
S
B
c
–
4
14
25
P
ol
an
d
S
ta
te
&
co
op
er
at
iv
es
d
63
71
75
70
31
61
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
37
29
25
30
Y
ug
os
la
vi
a
S
ta
te
42
38
36
36
20
50
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
58
62
64
64
A Critical-Realist View of Housing Quality 51
N
ot
es
:
L
as
t
co
lu
m
n
do
es
no
t
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
fu
ll
in
te
rv
al
fo
r
th
e
ca
se
of
:
B
ul
ga
ri
a
19
81
–1
98
7;
G
D
R
,
19
81
–1
98
6;
H
un
ga
ry
,
19
81
–1
98
7;
P
ol
an
d,
19
81
–1
98
8;
R
om
an
ia
,
19
81
–
19
85
;
Y
ug
os
la
vi
a,
19
81
–1
98
6.
So
ur
ce
s:
D
at
a
w
er
e
es
tim
at
ed
fr
om
th
e
S
ov
ie
t
R
ep
ub
lic
of
E
st
on
ia
,
fr
om
ht
tp
://
pu
b.
st
at
.e
e/
px
-w
eb
.2
00
1/
I_
D
at
ab
as
/E
co
no
m
y/
05
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n/
07
G
ra
nt
ed
_b
ui
ld
in
g_
pe
r
m
its
_a
nd
_c
om
pl
et
ed
_b
ui
ld
in
gs
/0
7G
ra
nt
ed
_b
ui
ld
in
g_
pe
rm
its
_a
nd
_c
om
pl
et
ed
_b
ui
ld
in
gs
.a
sp
(L
as
t
ac
ce
ss
ed
N
ov
em
be
r
20
16
;
w
e
ar
e
gr
at
ef
ul
to
D
r
A
ve
H
us
sa
r
fo
r
in
di
ca
t-
in
g
th
e
so
ur
ce
;
se
e
al
so
H
us
sa
r
20
12
);
F
or
th
e
S
ov
ie
t
R
ep
ub
lic
s
of
L
at
vi
a
an
d
L
ith
ua
ni
a
w
e
ar
e
gr
at
ef
ul
to
D
r
A
le
ks
an
dr
a
B
ur
dy
ak
w
ho
pr
ov
id
ed
es
tim
at
es
(c
om
pu
te
d
fr
om
th
e
S
ta
tis
tic
al
Y
ea
rb
oo
ks
of
19
69
,
57
6–
57
9;
19
71
,
54
1–
54
4;
19
76
,
57
2–
57
5;
19
78
,
41
4;
19
91
;
al
l
in
R
us
si
an
).
F
or
th
e
C
ze
ch
re
gi
on
of
C
ze
ch
os
lo
va
ki
a
fr
om
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.c
zs
o.
cz
/d
oc
um
en
ts
/1
01
80
/2
05
33
75
4/
re
tr
o+
ta
bu
lk
a+
2.
xl
sx
/3
f5
f6
e4
f-
d4
7a
-4
0b
9-
98
0c
-3
7c
1e
27
14
50
1?
ve
rs
io
n=
1.
0
(w
e
ar
e
gr
at
ef
ul
to
D
r
P
et
r
S
un
eg
a
fo
r
in
di
ca
tin
g
th
e
so
ur
ce
an
d
tr
an
sl
at
in
g
th
e
ca
te
go
ri
es
).
F
or
th
e
re
st
of
th
e
co
un
tr
ie
s
fr
om
S
oa
ita
( 2
01
0,
26
0,
T
ab
le
21
,
an
d
45
,
T
ab
le
2)
(c
om
pu
te
d
fr
om
co
un
tr
y
ch
ap
te
rs
in
C
la
ph
am
et
al
.
19
96
;
S
ill
in
ce
19
90
;
T
ur
ne
r,
H
eg
ed
us
,
an
d
T
os
ic
s
19
92
).
a T
he
“s
ta
te
”
he
ad
in
g
in
cl
ud
es
un
its
bu
ilt
by
se
lf
-h
el
p
w
or
k;
ho
w
ev
er
,
th
e
st
at
e
al
so
su
bs
id
iz
ed
ru
ra
l
se
lf
-b
ui
ld
in
g
by
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
in
w
ha
t
w
as
th
e
ex
ce
pt
io
na
l
A
lb
an
ia
n
ap
pr
oa
ch
to
ex
tr
em
e
un
de
r-
ur
ba
ni
za
tio
n.
b
H
ou
si
ng
co
op
er
at
iv
es
in
th
e
G
D
R
w
er
e
hi
gh
ly
ce
nt
ra
liz
ed
an
d
su
bs
id
iz
ed
,
pr
ac
tic
al
ly
no
di
ff
er
en
t
fr
om
th
e
st
at
e
pr
ov
is
io
n
(t
ho
ug
h
th
ey
te
nd
ed
to
be
al
lo
ca
te
d
by
cr
ite
ri
a
of
m
er
it
to
em
pl
oy
ee
s
ra
th
er
th
an
by
ne
ed
).
c N
S
B
st
an
ds
fo
r
ho
us
in
g
de
ve
lo
pe
d
w
ith
m
or
tg
ag
e
lo
an
s
fr
om
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
S
av
in
g
B
an
k.
d
H
ou
si
ng
co
op
er
at
iv
es
in
P
ol
an
d
w
er
e
ge
nu
in
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
to
st
at
e
pr
ov
is
io
n.
S
in
ce
19
60
th
ey
pr
od
uc
ed
ab
ou
t
ha
lf
of
al
l
ne
w
dw
el
lin
gs
bo
th
fo
r
re
nt
in
g
an
d
bu
ild
in
g-
fo
r-
sa
le
(w
hi
ch
re
qu
ir
ed
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l
do
w
n-
pa
ym
en
ts
).
U
nf
or
tu
na
te
ly
w
e
la
ck
ed
di
sa
gg
re
ga
te
d
da
ta
.
52 A. M. Soaita and C. Dewilde
Albania, Poland, Romania and the USSR entered their post-communist transition
with acute housing shortages.
Based on the above considerations, we formulate three hypotheses (H) that gauge
the path-dependent nature of housing quality:
H1: Housing quality is patterned along the lines of divisions between the
Soviet model, the reformist EEHM and classical EEHM.
H2: Households’ housing quality is superior in the former reformist-socialist
countries than in the classical-socialist ones.
H2a: Given differential state support, we expect some within-cluster differences
in housing quality, particularly Poland and Bulgaria being within-cluster out-
liers.
These hypotheses counteract claims of continued convergence in post-communist
housing systems. For instance, revisiting the nature of communist and post-commu-
nist tenure arrangements, Stephens, Lux, and Sunega (2015) demonstrated the uni-
versalistic, unitary nature of rental and personal tenures across all communist
countries since rules of access, rights of occupancy, security of tenure and housing
costs were very similar. We support this view of convergence in tenure arrangements
but not in relation to housing quality and modes of housing provision, which differed
across groups of countries. However, have these ideologically rooted differences per-
sisted during the post-communist construction of housing markets?
4. Mapping Post-Communist Structural Change
While economic depression during the 1990s left the communist housing legacies
broadly unchallenged (Lowe 2004), post-2000 economic growth has stimulated
housing change. As the 1990s reforms of housing privatization and restitution are by
now well-documented (Clapham et al. 1996; Lowe and Tsenkova 2003), we will
focus on the changes that have taken place since 2000. Economic growth and remit-
tances have stimulated new housing construction throughout the region, stirring
(self-built) suburbanization (Hirt 2008; Soaita 2013; Stanilov 2007), private regener-
ation of communist housing estates (Cirman, Mandič, and Zorić 2013; Soaita 2012;
Vranic, Vasilevska, and Haas 2015) and gentrification in some cities (Górczyńska
2016; Kovács, Wiessner, and Zischner 2012).
Indeed, the economic trajectories of these countries varied widely (Figure A1 in
the online annex maps GDP-growth and income inequality across countries). Nota-
bly, Slovenia and the Czech Republic started from better positions and have main-
tained their economic lead; the Baltic States have caught up spectacularly after 2000,
whereas Bulgaria and Romania have lagged behind (Croatia’s post-2008 economic
downfall brought its GDP/capita to the Romanian figure). The distribution of eco-
nomic growth has also varied. In terms of income distribution, the former reformist-
socialist states have maintained a drive for equality (including Poland, where high-
inequality levels have fallen to the intermediate ones of Hungary and Croatia). Con-
versely, the formal classical-socialist countries show some of the highest inequality
levels within the EU. Political and welfare scholars (Adascalitei 2012) argued that
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the choice for (in)equality stemmed from differential levels of economic develop-
ment in 1990, which allowed enacting (or not) redistributive policies and political
autonomy from the neoliberal agenda pursued by International Monetary Fund and
World Bank through borrowing conditionality. In a critical-realist view of stratified
reality (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1989), these economic factors are not just the context
of housing systems but powerful underlying structures of housing quality.
Interestingly, national patterns of income inequality have been associated with pat-
terns of demographic change.6 Populations have remained about constant in the for-
mer reformist-socialist, economically successful Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia
and Slovakia (and even in Croatia, after an initial 13% war-driven fall). However,
population has decreased significantly in the former classical-socialist, economically
laggard states though causes are complex and include economic and nationalistic-
driven migration besides falling birth rates. Population decreases are rarely acknowl-
edged in comparative housing studies even though this has important implications
for how housing is occupied and managed. As positive consequences, overcrowding
levels have fallen (Eurostat 2016)7 and remittances have contributed to new-building
(Soaita 2014). On the negative side, vacancies have increased and demographic age-
ing has accelerated, posing challenges to housing maintenance.
However, new housing provision has remained low. Within the EU, Census 2011
(Eurostat 2016) revealed the lowest share of housing stock built since 1990 in Latvia
(10%), followed by Lithuania, Romania and Estonia at 3–4 percentage points higher.
Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic showed levels of 16–18%, whereas
Poland and Croatia show levels of over 21%, close to the EU average.8 The key
implication of this is that the communist-built housing, accounting for 59–75 per-
centage of total housing stock, remains to significantly influence the housing quality
experienced by households.
Relating measures of housing quality and deprivation among homeowners,
Mandič (2010) found very high levels of unfit housing (50%) and severe deprivation
(25–43%) among homeowners in the former classical-socialist states, which indicates
the problematic nature of homeownership given owners’ inability to safeguard their
housing through appropriate maintenance. The situation in the former reformist-
socialist states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia was better
and comparable to that in the EU Mediterranean countries (but much worse than in
the rest of the EU). This ties in well with a branch of scholarship relating housing
outcomes to welfare regimes (Dewilde and De Decker 2016; Stephens, Lux, and
Sunega 2015) and with an emerging attention to the welfare arrangements in post-
communist nations (Aidukaite 2011; Kuitto 2016). Commonly, the latter highlights
welfare-state thrift in all these countries though the more generous provision in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia are also recognized9 (Figure A2 in the online
annex illustrates these arguments in terms of total social spending as percentage of
GDP and the share of population at risk of poverty and social exclusion).
To enable the functioning of the new housing markets, governments have tried
building up systems of housing finance, inspired by the German savings bank sys-
tem.10 However, outright homeownership – including buying with family-pooled
cash – remained a defining feature of post-communist housing systems, embedded
as they are in large informal economies. With reference to Russia, Zavisca (2012)
observed a strong cultural resistance to mortgage debt, which, she argued, was inter-
nalized as a legacy of the communist promise for free housing, resulting in “property
without markets”. Eastern Europeans’ resistance to mortgage debt was also observed
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elsewhere (Soaita and Searle 2016) and justified by a refusal to pay the high servic-
ing costs of a mortgage; indeed, high mortgage interest rates and bank fees have
made market-borrowing unaffordable even during the 2000s (Hegedus and Struyk
2005). Housing was commonly cast as a place of home and definitely not seen as an
asset (Lux et al. 2016; Soaita 2015).
Nonetheless, mortgaged homeownership is on the increase. Figure 3 illustrates
some paradoxical market dynamics between financialization trends (indicated by
mortgage debt/GDP), house price volatility and residential mobility worthy of future
research. Mortgage debt/GDP ratios have increased (top panel). If in 2000 all post-
communist EU states bar Estonia and Latvia showed figures below 10%, by 2014
only Bulgaria and Romania were below this figure. While these levels seem still
low, they evidence new lines of division across the Eastern European housing sys-
tems. Comparing trends in housing financialization and residential mobility (Figure 3,
top panel), Estonian housing is clearly the most commodified and the Romanian and
Bulgarian ones the least. Commodification may be expected to translate income into
Figure 3. Market dynamics. Source: Authors’ compilation from HYPOSTAT (2005, 2007,
2011, 2013, 2015, 2016) for all except Eurostat’s (2016) mobility rates available at https://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?data-set=ilc_hcmp05&lang=en.
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housing inequality and diminish egalitarian legacies of housing de-commodification
(Soaita 2014).
Paradoxically between 2001 and 2008, these immobile, non-financialized housing
markets saw some of the highest EU price bubbles of 3–8-fold and 2–2.5-fold
increases in the former classic-socialist and reformist states, respectively (Figure 3,
bottom panels). Exuberant growth turned into some of the most spectacular EU prop-
erty-busts with house prices falling commonly by 10–30% but by 50% in Latvia and
Romania. High volatility in quite immobile and non-financialized markets is a
conundrum for future research (indicative of remittance-based and largely informal
economies). Under conditions of low housing output, high house price growth (even
after discounting the post-GFC busts) and predominant cash transactions, family sup-
port for young people to access independent housing – or alternatively to stay put in
the parental home – has been crucial and resulted in complex co-residence arrange-
ments. From this point of view, the housing systems in Eastern Europe were viewed
as an extreme case of Mediterranean familism (Mandic 2008).
Having concisely mapped some significant structural changes traversed by post-
communist societies since the fall of communism, we acknowledge the possibility of
divergent change by pairing H1 with:
H1a: Housing quality is no longer patterned along the lines of division between
the three communist housing systems presented in Section 3 – but we make no
assumption of likely new configurations.
As we are interested in the nature of housing inequality, we aim to explore the com-
parative importance of inherited rural/urban inequality versus income-instilled
inequality in housing quality at the level of households. Although there are complex
interdependencies between these two forms of inequality, we expect that:
H3: Differences in housing quality between urban/rural households are higher
than those between lower/higher-income households.
H4: Differences in housing quality between lower-/higher-income households
are higher in the more unequal than in the more equal countries. In other
words, the more egalitarian legacies of housing de-commodification are fading
faster in the former than the latter countries.
5. Method
We explore similarities and differences in housing quality across countries by means
of HCA. This is a statistical technique for discovering underlying similarities
between cases based on a variety of quantifiable features and it has been widely used
to cluster affinities between countries (e.g. Danforth 2014; Kammer, Niehues, and
Peichl 2012; Mandel 2009; Mandic 2008). The aim is to have the most similar coun-
tries in each cluster, which concomitantly are most dissimilar to countries in other
clusters. HCA starts by considering each case as a separate cluster; then, step by
step, the most similar two clusters are merged until all cases form one single cluster.
In an exploratory fashion, we compare country clusters’ averages by one-way
ANOVA and Tukey tests in order to explore where the difference lies for each
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variable. Given our small number of country cases and our exploratory approach, we
accept levels of statistical significance of p < 0.10.
With other scholars (Mandel 2009), we opt for a wider range of indicators in order
to more finely tune our exploratory analysis to the ontological depth of housing qual-
ity as defined in Section 2. We opt for 10 micro-indicators reflecting the three dimen-
sions of households’ experiences of housing quality and 9 macro-indicators
measuring the five underlying structural domains. While we are interested in con-
tributing towards a typology of post-communist housing quality, we also aim to pro-
gress towards an explanation of the observed patterns. Indicators are presented in
Box 1. Data availability allows us to quantify long-term change in seven out of nine
macro-indicators (S1–S7),11 but not in micro-variables. This is not necessarily prob-
lematic as, to achieve a meaningful comparison, we wish to anchor our assessment
of households’ housing quality in one recent year. Hence, our single-year indicators
and end-year for period indicators refer to 2012, when Eurostat conducted the special
housing module in the EU Statistics in Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
Country figures are shown in Table 2 (Tables A2 and A3 in the online annex show
Pearson bivariate correlations).
Box 1. Our choice of indicators.
Micro-indicators (housing quality at the level of households)
Housing conditions
Q1 Dwelling size in m2 Source: Census 2011 (Eurostat 2016). As measures of
overcrowding ignore floor area, we include this adjacent
measure of residential well/ill-being
Q2 Housing deprivation Source: our calculation based on Eurostat microdata for
2012.a Measured by % of total population having neither
a bath, nor a shower, nor indoor flushing toilet in their
household (Eurostat 2012)
Q3 Difficulty to access
transport
Source: our calculation based on Eurostat microdata for
2012. Measured by the % of population reporting (very)
high difficulty in accessing public transport while having
no car in their households (Eurostat 2012)
Households’ (affordability) arrangements
Q4 Overcrowding Source: our calculation based on Eurostat microdata for
2012. Measured by the % of population in overcrowded
homes as per Bedroom Standard (Eurostat 2012)
Q5 Extended-fam./
composite households
Source: our calculation based on Eurostat microdata for
2012. Measured by the % share of population living in
any type of household, which is not one or two adults,
(with or without dependent childrenb (Eurostat 2012)
Q6 Total housing cost
overburden
Source: our calculation based on Eurostat microdata for
2012. Represents % of the population in households
where total housing costs take more than 25% for
quintile 1; 30% for quintile 2; 40% for quintile 3; 50%
for quintiles 4 and 5 (Eurostat 2012)
(Continued)
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Housing inequalities
D1 Distance poor For each Q2–6, we construct four “distances from the
mean” (see Sunega and Lux 2016) for population in
quintile 1 (“poor”) and 5 (“rich”) of equivalised income
and for population in densely/intermediately-populated
areas (“urban”) and thinly-populated areas (“rural”).c To
highlight positive/negative outcomes, we discount these
values from national averages so that positive/negative
figures reflect positive/negative outcomes. We then
average across each set of five, obtaining our D1–4
indicators. This operationalisation cancels some of the
difference, reflecting common trade-offs (e.g. urbanites
may suffer of overcrowding but have better transport)
(Eurostat 2012)
D2 Distance rich
D3 Distance urban
D4 Distance rural
Macro-indicators (underlying structures)
The economic field
S1 Change in GDP/capita in PPP,
1995–2012
Source: World Bank (2016). 1995 is the earlier year for
which data is available for all 11 countries. PPP stands
for Purchasing Power Parity
S2 Change in Gini coefficient for
the income distribution since
the fall of communism
Source: World Bank (2016) and Eurostat (2016). We use
1987–1989 values from World Bank, the only available
source, and our constructed average value for the post-
2007, i.e. 2008–2012 (Eurostat 2016). We must note a
major discrepancy between World Bank and Eurostat in
post-2007 values for Romania, the former showing
Romania as belonging to the group of equal rather than
unequal countries
Communist housing legaciesd
S3 % of houses built during
communism (in the 2011
housing stock)
Source: Census 2011 (Eurostat 2016). This commonly
includes households’ self-building (with or without
financial support from the state)
S4 % of flats built during
communism (in the 2011
housing stock)
Source: Census 2011 (Eurostat 2016). A flat is a
dwelling in buildings of three or more unites, this being
a close proxy for state provision in classical-socialist
states but not necessarily in the reformist ones (for it
includes cooperatives)
Housing market dynamics
S5 % of mortgage debt to GDP in
2012
Source: HYPOSTAT (2016). Although this measures
2012 levels, it can be seen as measuring change since
mortgage levels have started fro\m virtually null levels
in most countries (inherited mortgage levels in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia having been swept by inflation
in the early 1990s)
(Continued)
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6. Results
We perform HCA by means of Ward’s method of classification (using squared
Euclidian distances) in order to identify countries’ affinities according to our 19 vari-
ables (both macro- and micro-indicators). As variables have different measurement
scales, we use Z-scores for standardization.
Figure 4 displays graphically the results in the form of a dendrogram, which
should be read from left to right. It is up to the researcher to decide the cut-off point
for the number of clusters that best accommodate the theories which have informed
the selection of variables. However, the dendrogram and the agglomeration schedule
(not shown) offer visual and numerical indications. The three-cluster solution best
fits our purpose. Countries are grouped as follows:12
S6 House value growth,
2003–2008 (n-fold increase)
Source: HYPOSTAT. We indexed house value growth to
2003 using annual rates published by HYPOSTAT
(2005, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016)
Population dynamics
S7 % of population change
1990–2012
Source: Eurostat (2016). We opt for the number of
population rather than households for the latter is
mediated via household composition, relating housing
availability, affordability and strategies of migration in
countless ways
Social spending
S8 % of population at risk of
poverty & social exclusion
Source: Eurostat (2016), data for 2012
S9 % total social spending as
percentage to GDP
Source: Eurostat (2016), data for 2012
aEurostat microdata consist of face-to-face interviews of nationally representative samples; the number of
individuals aged 16 and over who were interviewed in 2012 ranged from 11,224 (LT) to 30,755 (PL).
bDependent child: aged 15 or less, or aged between 16 and 24 and economically inactive. We considered
an additional variable “young people access to independent housing” measured by the % of population liv-
ing in households with adult children (i.e. aged 19–35, excluding those aged 19–26 in education), which
we dropped given the high correlation between these variables (p = 0.969) and their theoretical overlap.
cAs this code is unavailable in Slovenia’s microdata, we used estimates (e.g. averages of “cities”/“town
and suburbs” for Q1, Q4; proportional estimates for Q5 against the all-countries average; proportional esti-
mates for Q2, Q3, and Q6 against comparative values for Slovenia from 2012 Eurostat aggregate data and
Census 2011; we are grateful to Prof. Andreja Cirman for providing data support.
dThe share of communist-built houses and flats in the 2011 housing stock is both a proxy for communist
forms of housing provision by households and state/cooperatives, respectively – measuring thus the lega-
cies of the three communist housing models by 2011 – as they are indicators of change since the housing
stock is continually transformed through new housing construction, demolition and change of use (we will
check the robustness of our results by inclusion of five more macro-indicators, including the share of post-
communist build housing).
Box 1. (Continued)
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 SEE: south-east Europe of the former classic EEHM (BG, RO).
 CEE: central-east Europe of the former reformist EEHM (CZ, HR, HU, PL,
SI, SK).
 BS: the Baltic States of the former Soviet housing model (EE, LV, LT).
These results confirm H1 (rejecting the alternative H1a). Conceptualized in a
critical-realist vein of deep ontology, patterns of housing quality cluster neatly along
the past lines of divisions between the three communist housing models presented in
Section 3. This supports the idea of path-dependent change (most of our macro-vari-
ables indeed being measures of change). Claims of convergence across post-commu-
nist housing should be rejected since clustering patterns still reflect communist
housing models 22 years after the fall of communism despite relatively similar
housing policies pursued since (Hegedüs, Lux, and Teller 2013).
However, these results will not surprise housing scholars as they match the tradi-
tional geographical grouping of the SEE and CEE countries observed in many analy-
ses during the 1990s; differences tended to be explained by post-communist trends
rather than the inherited constitution of housing systems, which were considered to be
all too similar. As the Baltic States entered the field of comparative housing somewhat
later, there was ambiguity related to their comparative position though they were com-
monly grouped together (Hegedus and Tosics 1998; Tosics 2003). Slightly different
country groupings (Poland grouped with BS) and similarities between the SEE and
BS countries were sometimes observed (Mandic 2008; Mandič 2010; Mandic and Cir-
man 2011). However, our analysis shows that the similarities among the three Baltic
States are larger than their similarities with any other post-communist EU states.
Figure 4. Clustering patterns (HCA on 19 variables). Source: SPSS software output. Notes:
The visual clue is the length of the horizontal interval between two merging steps. The
solution of three clusters is thus obvious. The three clusters remain stable upon the
elimination of variable Q2 (see Figure A1 in the online annex) and/or the inclusion of five
additional macro-indicators (i.e. GDP/capita in 1995; post-communist built stock; %
homeoweners in total population; 2007–2012 residential mobility rates; % change in
household numbers, see Figure A2 in the online annex).
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Table 3. ANOVA test for cluster means with ranking scores for housing quality.
F Sig. SEE CEE BS
Q1 Dwelling size 6.745 0.019 58.51
B 79.73
A 64.12
B
Q2 Housing deprivation 10.621 0.006 24.21
B 1.73
A 13.02
B
Q3 Difficult access to transport 15.061 0.002 14.11
A 5.03
B 7.92
B
Housing conditions: score 3 9 6
Q4 Overcrowding 2.473 0.146 48.41
A 36.02
A 23.63
A
Q5 Extended-fam./composite hlds 3.075 0.102 43.01
A 34.52 25.43
B
Q6 Housing cost overburden 2.190 0.174 22.11
A 17.22
A 15.33
A
Household arrangements: score 3 6 9
D1 Distance poor 6.464 0.021 −17.51
A −12.02
B −11.43
B
D2 Distance rich 2.040 0.192 11.21
A 6.13
A 9.62
A
Housing inequality/income: score 2 5 5
D3 Distance urban 3.879 0.066 4.61
A 1.23
B 2.82
D4 Distance rural 5.738 0.028 −6.91
A −1.83
B −2.92
Housing inequality/place: score 2 6 4
Overall score: housing quality 10 26 24
S1 GDP/capita change 1995–2012 3.741 0.071 12,069A 14,737 17,675B
S2 Gini change 1989–2013 8.216 0.011 10.8B 4.1A 11.5B
S3 Communist-built houses 6.429 0.022 37.6B 29.9B 16.0A
S4 Communist-built flats 10.737 0.005 36.0B 31.6B 52.2A
S5 Mortgage debt to GDP, 2015 8.267 0.011 7.7A 17.8B 24.8B
S6 House price boom 2003–2008 7.781 0.013 5.2A 1.8B 3.0B
S7 Population change 1990–2014 14.891 0.002 −15.8B −1.3A −19.0B
S8 Population at risk of poverty 7.342 0.015 46.3A 24.7B 30.7B
S9 Total social spending % of GDP 9.618 0.007 16.0B 20.8A 15.2B
Notes:
Subscript bold numbering: these indicate simple ranking scores on housing quality (from 3 = best to
1 = worst). The minimum ranking sum a cluster may get is 10 and the maximum 30. As any ranking
method this remains relative for equal ranking steps may not reflect households’ preferences; it also does
not control for the actual magnitude of the difference between indicators although for differences of less
than 5 percentage point we would split the score equally.
Superscript bold capital letters: these indicate results of a multiple comparisons by Tukey post hoc HSD
test for each variable (subset for alpha = 0.1; p ranging from 0.003 to 0.092). As the group sizes are
unequal, the harmonic mean of the group sizes is used (n = 3), type I error levels being not guaranteed;
nonetheless, descriptively, these differences are also visible to the naked eye. Combinations:
 A–B–C indicates that all three clusters’ means are statistically different.
 A–B–B shows that one cluster’s mean is statistically different from the means of the other two
(which are no different, making so a single cluster).
 A–B-nothing indicates that only two means are statistically different (imagine a ladder with three
rungs: the extreme groups are statistically different but the one in between shows similarities with
both, the upper and the lower rung).
 A–A–A shows that clusters’ means are not statistically different, making so a single cluster.
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We will now have a more detailed look at Table 3, which shows the cluster
means. We note statistically significant differences for all 9 macro-indicators
(at p < 0.05 for 8 indicators) and for 7 out of 10 micro-indicators (at p < 0.05 for
6 indicators). This suggests that clustering patterns are stronger in macro- than
micro-indicators. On the one hand, we did not theoretically expect a neat corre-
spondence since critical realism conceives causality as contingent and credits
households’ agency in negotiating structural constraints. For instance, the bell-
shaped distribution of co-residence (and of young people in the parental home)
across income quintiles suggests that, besides affordability constraints, other fac-
tors are at play.13 On the other hand, the statistical clustering algorithm takes into
consideration within-cluster dispersion, which is higher in micro- than macro-indi-
cators. For instance regarding overcrowding, the lack of a significant difference
between very different cluster means is partially a statistical outcome of within-
cluster dispersion, ranging from 14.8 (Slovenia) to 44.2 (Poland) in the CEE clus-
ter and from 14.2 (Estonia) to 39.4 (Latvia) in the BS cluster. We will return to
within-cluster dispersion in housing quality later.
Table 3 also shows by superscript letters that no single variable differentiates
across all three clusters; it is rather the dynamics between each combination of two
possible clusters (e.g. S3), and differences between the extremes (e.g. S1) that deter-
mine the outcome. The superscript letters tell us where the difference between clus-
ters lies by variables – but results should be read descriptively only since clusters are
of unequal size. Interestingly, variables S3 and S4 in conjunction with Q1 and Q2
and D3 and D4 highlight the continuing legacies of the three communist housing
models discussed in Section 3:
 [SEE = CEE] ≠ BS on the share of communist-built houses and flats reflect
key differences between the EEHM and the Soviet housing model – i.e. Hege-
dus’ and Tosics’s (1992) thesis – in that the state was a less important provider
in the former than in the latter; but
 CEE ≠ [SEE = BS] on housing conditions and rural/urban-induced housing
inequalities reflects key differences between the classic and reformist EEHMs
– i.e. Kornai’s (1992) thesis – in that the reformist socialist-states produced
higher quality housing than their centralized counterparts.
Furthermore, interesting links between socio-economic and housing inequality are
revealed by variables S2 and S9 in conjunction to S8 and D1:
 [SEE = BS] ≠ CEE on Gini increase and total social spending, which describe
the unique CEE drive for socio-economic equality; yet
 [CEE = BS] ≠ SEE on population at risk of poverty/social exclusion and odds
of low-income households suffering poor housing quality describes an unex-
pectedly good performance of BS despite its choice for inequality. Possible
explanations are the filtering down of outstanding economic growth and better
(inherited) housing conditions on which BS ≠ SEE.
To elaborate on H2 regarding households’ experiences of housing quality being
higher in the former reformist EEHM (i.e. CEE) than in the classical-socialist states
(i.e. SEE and BS), we advance a simple ranking exercise of clusters’ means related
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to housing quality indicators.14 Table 3 shows these scores in subscripts and addi-
tional rows. Out of a min/max of 10/30 scores, the CEE cluster was ranked first, the
BS a close second and SEE the worst. This allows us to affirm that H2 regarding
housing quality being higher in the former reformist-socialist than classic-socialist
states is supported by data, yet the small difference between CEE and BS clusters
requires reflection.
If it is true that housing quality in the USSR was poorer than in the reformist
EEHM as the literature suggest (Sillince 1990) and as our scoring on housing condi-
tions maintains (“6” for BS and “9” for CEE in Table 3) – then we witness a process
of BS catching up with the CEE cluster. This seems stirred by some structural post-
communist developments: the highest rates of population decrease, high GDP growth
and housing market financialization, which have improved housing availability and
access (indeed, note the higher BS versus CEE scoring on housing arrangements in
Table 3).
Finally, we wish to concisely elaborate on H3, related to our assumption that
urban/rural-induced differences in housing quality are higher than the income-related
ones. Data clearly reject this assumption. In all clusters (Table 3 but also for each
country as shown in Table 2), the sum of the absolute values for the pair of urban/ru-
ral distances is much lower than the corresponding sum for the pair of poor/rich dis-
tances. The respective figures are 11.5 and 28.6 for SEE; 5.7 and 21.0 for BS; and
4.0 and 18.1 for CEE. The fact that income-related inequalities are higher than those
stemming from urban/rural divisions is however not only an outcome of the post-
communist transition but directs attention to recognized socio-economic inequalities
during communism (Szelenyi 1983).
This exercise lets us also concisely elaborate on H4, related to our assumption that
income-related housing inequalities are higher in the more unequal BS and SEE
clusters than in the more equal CEE one. Indeed SEE shows the highest figure
(28.6), followed by BS (21.0) and the CEE (18.1), thus supporting our H4. However,
we wish to flag the fact that BS is closer positioned to CEE than SEE which puts
additional weight on our previous observation that high socio-economic inequality in
the BS cluster does not straightforwardly translate into housing inequality. We also
observe that income-related housing inequality is higher at the bottom than at the
top: lower income households are more likely to suffer negative outcomes than are
higher income households likely to enjoy positive outcomes. This is true for all clus-
ters (Table 3) and for each country (Table 2). We acknowledge, however, that
income and place inequalities show complex interdependencies and trades-offs and
that we cannot control for endogeneity in this analysis (e.g. the phenomenon of rural
poverty particularly acute in Bulgaria and Romania).
6.1. Nuancing the Results: Addressing the Issue of Within-Cluster Dispersion
We already noted the issue of within-cluster dispersion in our micro-indicators. To
explore this further, we will perform two additional HCAs, separately for macro-
and micro-indicators. Figure 5 displays the two dendrograms, showing our choice
for the cut-off point. We note the same three-cluster solution on macro-indicators
(BS, CEE and SEE) but a four-cluster solution on micro-indicators. We will
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further reflect exclusively on the latter. Countries are now grouped in the following
clusters:
 Incomplete SEE, henceforth SEEi (RO; without BG).
 Incomplete CEE, henceforth CEEi (CZ, HR, SI, SK; without HU, PL).
 Hybrid SEE and CEE, henceforth Mix-EE (BG, HU, PL).
 Unchanged BS (EE, LV, LT).
We find these results particularly revealing because the Mix-EE cluster includes
the worst performer in the communist reformist EEHM and the best one in the clas-
sic EEHM, i.e. Poland and Bulgaria, respectively. We expected these countries to
induce within-cluster dispersion (H2a), which our analysis confirmed. Housing
scholarship has offered us no grounds to deduce Hungary’s intermediate position but
country data in Table 2 clearly expose it: in terms of worst/second worst ranks
within the CEE, Hungary gets nine (with Poland getting seven, Croatia two and the
Czech Republic one).
We conclude this assessment by highlighting that, on a scale from 10 to 40
(Table 4), the ranking score on housing quality totals 10.5 for Romania (worst
performance); 23 and 29 for the Mix-EE and BS, respectively (intermediate perfor-
mance); and 37.5 for CEEi (best performance). In terms of specific dimensions of
housing quality, the same worst/intermediate/best patterns hold for housing
conditions, urban/rural-related and income-related housing inequality but not for
households’ (affordability) arrangements with BS being the best performer, closely
followed by CEEi (both SEEi and Mix-EE showing poor performances). We will
come back to this in the concluding section.
Figure 5. Deconstructing clustering patterns by macro- and micro-indicators. Source: SPSS
software output. Note: The three cluster solution (left side) and four cluster solution (right
side) remain stable upon the elimination of variable Q2 and/or the inclusion of additional
macro-indicators (i.e. GDP/capita in 1995; post-communist built stock; % homeoweners in
total population; 2007–2012 residential mobility rates; % change in household numbers, see
Figure A1 and A2 in the online annex).
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7. Conclusions
We chose a long-term perspective to examine the extent to which patterns of housing
quality across the 11 post-communist EU countries share commonalities and where
important differences arise. Particularly, we aimed to explore whether ideologically
rooted past differences in housing provision have persisted during the post-commu-
nist construction of housing markets. We conceived housing quality in a critical-real-
ist approach of stratified ontology and operationalized it in terms of micro- and
macro-indicators reflecting households’ experiences and their underlying structural
dimensions. These indicators were used to conduct explorative HCA.
7.1. “Running on Parallel Tracks” (Hypotheses 1 and 1a)
Our analysis evidenced that patterns of housing quality across sampled countries still
cluster along the same historic lines of division – the three communist housing mod-
els presented in Section 3 – in the groups of the Baltic States, central-east Europe
and south-east Europe (supporting our hypothesis 1 and rejecting its alternative 1a).
This model of change can be described under the metaphor “running on parallel
Table 4. Nuancing housing quality across four clusters (ANOVA test and ranking scores).
F Sig.
SEEi CEEi BS Mix-EE
RO
CZ, HR, SI,
SK
EE, LV,
LT
BG, HU,
PL
Q1 Dwelling size 51.814 0.000 43.91 81.84 64.12 74.63
Q2 Housing deprivation 18.950 0.001 35.11 0.74 13.0 2 6.83
Q3 Difficult access to transport 6.194 0.022 16.71 4.84 7.9 2.5 7.62.5
Housing conditions: score 3 12 6.5 8.5
Q4 Overcrowding 3.255 0.090 52.01 30.43 23.6 4 46.32
Q5 Extended-fam./composite hlds 1.522 0.291 40.11 33.63 25.4 4 39.52
Q6 Housing cost overburden 3.187 0.094 21.51.5 15.43.5 15.3 3.5 21.41.5
Household arrangements: score 3.5 9.5 11.5 5.5
D1 Distance poor 6.818 0.017 −16.41 −10.74 −11.4 3 −15.92
D2 Distance rich 7.277 0.015 14.61 4.34 9.6 2.5 9.12.5
Housing inequality/income: score 2 8 5.5 4.5
D3 Distance urban 20.126 0.001 6.8 1 0.54 2.8 2.5 2.52.5
D4 Distance rural 34.909 0.000 −9.21 −0.74 −2.9 3 −4.12
Housing inequality/place: score 2 8 5.5 4.5
Overall score on: housing quality 10.5 37.5 29 23
Notes: Subscript bold numbering: these indicate simple ranking scores (from 4 = best to 1 = worst). The
minimum ranking sum a cluster may get is 10 and the maximum 40. As any ranking method, this
remains relative for equal ranking steps may not reflect households’ preferences; it also does not control
for the actual magnitude of the difference between indicators although for differences of less than
5 percentage point we split the score equally (e.g. R3, R6, R8 and R9). Having a one-country cluster,
we cannot explore multiple comparisons by Tukey post hoc HSD.
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tracks”, i.e. past legacies of difference were carried through the post-communist
transformation whether through continuities (i.e. persistent features of the built envi-
ronment; low residential mobility) or discontinuities (i.e. the choice for inequality;
migration). Conceptualizing this model of path-dependent change is one of our main
contributions to the current debates regarding the nature of post-communist housing
(Miao and Maclennan 2016; Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015). As common in clus-
ter analyses of country-cases, we faced the issue of statistical power. Rather than
reducing the number of variables to the sample size (for 11 countries, conventional
wisdom suggests the use of two/three variables), we preferred to nuance our analysis
by using a broader set of indicators; this however means that findings remain
exploratory. Under this reservation, we wish to further qualify our results.
7.2. Housing Quality at the Level of Households (Hypotheses 2 and 2a)
Our ranking exercise across the three clusters supported the assumption that housing
quality at the level of households is higher in the former reformist-socialist states
(i.e. CEE) than in the classical-socialist ones (i.e. BS and SEE). However, as we
hypothesized some degree of heterogeneity induced by different country perfor-
mances during communism, we have nuanced these findings. An HCA conducted
exclusively on micro-indicators differentiated between four clusters. These results
were revealing in that they differentiated a hybrid cluster, comprising the “laggards”
in the best-performing, reformist EEHM (Hungary and Poland) and the “leader” in
the worst-performing, classic EEHM (Bulgaria). Our analysis showed that house-
holds’ housing quality is worst in Romania; poor-to-intermediate in the mix group of
Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland; intermediate-to-good in the Baltic States, and best in
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia. Evidencing these differences in
housing quality, particularly singling out Romania from Bulgaria and highlighting
the second best position of the Baltic States is another contribution of our study to
comparative housing. Mandic and Cirman (2011) argued that communist legacies
were still present in housing conditions in 2003, and we evidenced they persisted in
2012; however, we showed there was no single, common legacy but indeed legacies
of difference.
7.3. Housing Inequalities by Place and Income (Hypotheses 3 and 4)
Our study indicated that housing inequalities at the level of households were overall
higher across income divisions than by urban/rural places (rejecting hypothesis 3).
Controlling for endogeneity between place of living and income at a finely grained
spatial scale is worth future research (Eurostat does not provide that information).
Housing inequality by income shows interesting patterns. As expected, the most
income-equal countries of the CEEi show the lowest inequality in housing outcomes;
and the income-unequal countries of the SEE show the highest levels. Surprisingly,
the Baltic States, the most income-unequal countries in our sample, show the second
lowest levels of inequality in housing outcomes. Thus, the division of low versus
high socio-economic inequality between the former reformist-socialist states (CEE)
and the classical-socialist ones (BS and SEE) does not consistently filter down to
households’ housing situations, which is an intriguing finding of our analysis.
In other words, high socio-economic inequality is associated with high housing
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inequalities in the SEE but not in the BS cluster (despite both clusters sharing
increases of 11 percentage points in Gini coefficient for income since 1990). Table 3
showed that, on average, SEE’s lower and higher income households are farther
away from the national mean than they are in the other two clusters, whereas lower
income households are on average better off in BS than in the more equal CEE clus-
ter. In our view, housing legacies in conjunction with demographic changes have
advantaged the BS versus SEE housing systems. SEE’s states and households pro-
duced poorer quality housing during communism than their Soviet counterparts (e.g.
smaller dwellings; lack of utility provision), while higher population falls in BS
improved quantitative deficits (including by means of residential mobility in more
financialized housing markets).
An argument can be made that legacies of housing de-commodification – whether
through command economies, self-building, co-habitation or inheritance – still tem-
per the translation of income into housing inequality, particularly so in the Baltic
States. First and foremost, this seems supported by many micro-indicators being not
(much) different across countries of high (BS) and low (CEEi) income inequality, as
shown in Table 4: housing cost overburden, overcrowding, extended-family/compos-
ite households and the disadvantage suffered by lower income households showing
comparable levels. While this is true at our level of aggregation and in our method-
ological construction of housing inequality – in which we allowed for some trade-
offs by averaging values across variables for each target group – we believe compar-
ative cross-country analysis on relevant subgroups of population would be wel-
comed.
7.4. Future Change: Explanatory Mechanisms for (Dis)Continuities
We highlighted that no single variable differentiates between all three clusters, which
theoretically means that clusters may be more amenable to change than otherwise
constituted. While notionally any trajectory of change could be imagined, some tra-
jectories may be more likely than others. For instance, we noted that the three-cluster
solution (reflecting the three communist housing models) was stronger in macro-
than micro-indicators, thus at least theoretically likely to become even more domi-
nant since structural factors trigger outcomes commonly with a time-lag. As critical-
realists’ aspiration is unravelling causal mechanisms that activate the powers of
underlying structures into the observed empirical events, we wish to conclude by
reflecting on some mechanisms for (dis)continuities and their implications to the nat-
ure of housing systems.
Within what has become recognized as the “consumption thesis”, Kemeny (1981)
argued that new-built housing constitutes a small part of the housing stock, hence
the larger structural effect of historic housing policies to households’
options/choices. This argument is particularly relevant to current patterns of housing
quality: path dependency is embedded in the nature of the communist-built environ-
ment, and its allocation given low levels of constructions and residential mobility.
But we will not fully understand continuity and change without reflecting on the
alternative “provision thesis” (Clapham, Clark, and Gibb 2012). To break out of this
path dependency in housing quality, the new-built housing should be both quantita-
tively significant and qualitatively superior.
A Critical-Realist View of Housing Quality 69
We showed elsewhere (Soaita 2017) that poor quality housing in Romania was
not only inherited but reproduced through new construction: low affordability and
norms of social acceptability meant that the share of new-built houses of wattle-and-
daub in the new stock approaches that of the old stock; likewise, new-built flats are
commonly no larger than those built during communism. Other mechanisms of con-
tinuity in housing outcomes include: “the privatization trap” (Lux and Sunega 2014)
discussed in Section 2; the “political stasis factor” (Hegedüs, Lux, and Teller 2013),
i.e. political difficulty to alter popular elements of the existing housing systems; and
fragmented ownership rights (Górczyńska 2016; Zavisca 2012) which impede the
regeneration of (pre)communist collective housing.
While the SEE cluster seems durable, we do not have to overplay the similarities
between the CEE and BS clusters for they have opted for very different political eco-
nomic paths, those of social democratic and neoliberal politics (Gini-coefficients bear
strong testimony). The choice of inequality (which is statistically correlated with pop-
ulation fall), increasing affluence and the fast financialization of BS housing markets
are clear mechanisms of discontinuity, warning us against endorsing over-determinis-
tic path dependency lenses. These new trends also have challenging implications for
housing inequalities. We showed that the relationship between income and housing
inequality is far from straightforward given legacies and current practices of housing
de-commodification which may vanish faster in the BS than in the SEE cluster.
Our study thus encourages further unravelling mechanisms through which post-
communist housing continuities are being reproduced and emerging discontinuities
constructed across countries and social groups. Given the inherent contribution of
mass outright homeownership to welfare in the post-communist space (Stephens,
Lux, and Sunega 2015), we suggest that scholarship on post-communist welfare
regimes would greatly benefit from a serious engagement with the differential nature
of housing systems. Finally, our study advances a valuable middle-range epistemo-
logical frame (Kemeny and Lowe 1998) for understanding the complex social reality
of housing at both the micro- and macro-level. This may inform specific policy ques-
tions, contextualize more focused analyses or help explain differential practices, aspi-
rations or expectations across (groups of) countries. Our study helps shatter the over-
generalist labelling of “post-communism” (Tuvikene 2016) and problematizes the
growing view that communist housing systems were all too similar; they indeed
were not.
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Notes
1. Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia
(LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI). During com-
munism, some were part of the Eastern Bloc (BG, Czechoslovakia, HU, PL, RO and Yugoslavia,)
while others were Soviet Republics of the USSR (EE, LV and LT).
2. Largely used in housing studies, the idea of housing system is rarely defined. In Kemeny’s (1981,
xiii) sociology of tenure, housing systems may be said to represent “the interplay between eco-
nomic organizations and political ideologies as constrained and modified by wider social struc-
tures”. Wider definitions include Bourne’s (1981, 12): “an imprecise, but nevertheless convenient
expression encompassing the full range of interrelationships between all the actors (individual and
corporate), housing units, and institutions involved in the production, consumption, and regulation
of housing”.Narrower definitions include Allen’s (2006, 272): “the complex of activities and prac-
tices which shape how people access housing” and Stephens and Fitzpatrick’s (2007, 205): “the
housing market and housing policies”.
3. Conversely, security of tenure is less challenging in the post-communist “super-ownership soci-
eties” where co-residence is preferred to private renting.
4. For instance, Kornai (1992) writes: “The strength of application and the specific constellation of
the tendencies described in this book will vary appreciably from country to country and from per-
iod to period. There is repression in every country at every stage, but in one it applies on a mass
scale in a particularly merciless way, while in another country or period it can be felt to be rela-
tively mild. There is a command economy everywhere, but in one place it operates pedantically,
with painstaking concern for the smallest detail, while in another it works sloppily and unreliably.
Everywhere and always there is a shortage economy, but while the food shortage is unbearable in
one country, the accustomed degree of shortage is quite tolerable in another” (370). Likewise
“One type predominates, but attributes of another are woven into it, and the mixture may be
accompanied by internal conflicts and the concurrent appearance of conflicting tendencies” (21).
5. Based on Kornai’s warning on the complexity of categorizing some countries (e.g. hybridism
across domains and time periods), of our reading of related housing scholarship (Michalovic
1992, 1996; Sykora 1996) and of first author’s positionality as a citizen of a former classical-so-
cialist state, we decided to include Czechoslovakia in the group of reformist-EEHM, a decision
with which not everybody might agree.
6. Interestingly, Pearson bivariate correlations (Table A3 in the online annex) evidence that popula-
tion change is statistically correlated with the change in Gini for income and uncorrelated with
the change in GDP, being thus linked to inequality rather than economic growth.
7. If in 2005 only the Czech Republic and Bulgaria had levels below 50%, the situation has
improved by 2014, only Romania showing levels above that figure.
8. For comparison, only Denmark, the United Kingdom and Belgium showed some similarly low
figures (12–17%). The highest EU figures were registered in Spain (32%), Portugal (35%), Ireland
(43%) and Cyprus (52%).
9. However, welfare spending remains uncorrelated with the share of population at risk of
poverty/social exclusion since it is not necessarily the poor who benefit from welfare spending
(Hegedüs, Lux, and Teller 2013).
10. These were implemented in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993; Hungary in 1997; Croatia
in 1998; Romania in 2003; Bulgaria in 2004; whereas, the US-inspired securitization system was
only implemented in Russia and Ukraine (Stephens, Lux, and Sunega 2015).
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11. We wished to quantify the different starting positions of these countries on their post-communist
transitions by sets of paired 1990/2012 variables, but data availability requires separate analytical
decisions for each indicator.
12. We decided to name the 2012 clusters by commonly accepted regional toponyms, resulting thus
in two different set of (communist/post-communist) names for what appears to be the same coun-
try-groups. Three crucial reasons grounded our decision: (1) politics of naming, i.e. a recognized,
meaningful, single terminology suitable for both communist/post-communist periods is nonexis-
tent; (2) symbolic recognition, i.e. these countries have traversed paradigmatic changes, including
border changes which we wish to acknowledge; (3) partial country coverage, i.e. the Soviet
model included all USSR Republics not only the Baltic States, the classic EEHM included Alba-
nia while SEE does not; and the reformist EEHM included all Yugoslavia not only Slovenia and
Croatia.
13. In all countries, quintiles 3 and 4 show higher levels of co-residence than quintiles 1 and 2, while
quintile 5 never displays the lowest figures as one would expect if only affordability was the
issue. Several mechanisms may be concomitantly at play, e.g. income constraints for quintiles 1
and 2, strategies of consumption, savings and family welfare for quintiles 3 and 4, and cultural
preferences across the board.
14. We interpret “better housing quality” in terms of larger dwellings and lower levels of each: hous-
ing deprivation, difficulty to access public transport, overcrowding, co-residence, cost overburden
and inequality differences (variables Q1–Q6 and D1–D4).
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